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What cognitive goods do children plausibly have a right to in
an education? In attempting to answer this question, I begin
with a puzzle centred around Joel Feinberg’s observation that
a denial of certain cognitive goods can violate a child’s right
to an open future. I show that propositionalist, dispositionalist
and objectualist characterisations of the kinds of cognitive
goods children have a right to, run in to problems. A promi-
sing alternative is then proposed and defended, one that is
inspired in the main by Wittgenstein’s ‘hinge’ epistemology as
developed in his posthumous On Certainty.
COGNITIVE GOODS AND EPISTEMIC RIGHTS
What cognitive goods should an education provide? There are a number
of ways to approach this question, and one useful place to begin is from a
rights-based perspective: an education should afford at least those cognitive
goods children plausibly have a right to. What cognitive goods are these?
On a first pass, it seems reasonable to say that there are certain facts
children have a right to know—and accordingly, that what children have a
right to is some (propositional) knowledge, leaving it open exactly which
specific knowledge. Extrapolating from this answer, we can call a more
general position vis-a`-vis the cognitive goods children plausibly have a
right to ‘propositionalism’, where propositionalism is the claim that the
kind of cognitive goods to which children have a right in education are
instances of propositional knowledge.
Joel Feinberg (2007) gives expression to the propositionalist idea in his
analysis of a Kansas Supreme Court case, where the state of Kansas refused
to accept an exemption forAmish familieswhowanted to keep their children
out of state-accredited schools altogether.1 The Kansas court ruled against
the Amish in this instance, and the legal rationale—aimed at protecting the
rights of the Amish children (which the state as parens patriae is obliged to
protect)—was in short that an education that withheld certain knowledge to
children would effectively undermine a child’s right to an open future.
For example, and in short, preventing a 13-year-old from knowing a
range of basic facts about human biology makes it ‘difficult to the point of
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near practical impossibility’ for that child to later become a physician or
scientist. As Feinberg puts it:
An education that renders a child fit for only one way of life fore-
closes irrevocably his other options . . . To be prepared for anything,
including the worst, in this complex and uncertain world would seem
to require as much knowledge as a child can absorb throughout his mi-
nority. These considerations led many to speak of a child’s birth-right
as to as much education as may be available to him (Feinberg, 2007,
p. 115).
On this line of thinking, something like propositionalism seems to be oper-
ating in the background—viz., in virtue of having a right to an open future,2
the kind of cognitive good children have the right to in their education is
knowledge of the sort that, by having that knowledge, a suitably wide range
of practical possibilities remains open.3
PROPOSITIONALISM VS. DISPOSITIONALISM: A PUZZLE
It turns out that propositionalism runs in to certain problems—and this point
can bemadewithout even straying fromdiscussions of children’s rights to an
open future (relative to which we just saw one way propositionalism might
in fact look very plausible). In writing his majority opinion in a similar case
a few years later—a case in which this time around, the Amish parents won
when requesting to keep their children out of state accredited schools for
two years, rather than altogether—Supreme Court Justice Burger says:
The value of education must be assessed in terms of its capacity
to prepare the child for life. It is one thing to say that compulsory
education for a year or two beyond the eighth grade may be necessary
when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in modern society
as the majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be
viewed as the preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian
community that is the keystone of the Amish faith.4
Implicit in Burger’s thinking here is that the life for which Amish children
should be prepared is an Amish life, and if this claim is granted, then the
cognitive goods constituting the ‘value of an education’ will plausibly be
whatever cognitive goods facilitate that particular life.
Obviously, this is not yet a strike against propositionalism; after all, if the
implicit assumption that Amish children will chose the Amish way of life
is right, then the cognitive goods Amish children might be said to have a
right to could just be whatever propositional knowledge is compatible with
an open future indexed to an antecedent commitment to an Amish life. This
is tantamount to the claim that the cognitive goods Amish children have a
right to is whatever propositional knowledge does not foreclose a relevant
class of options within an open Amish future.
But there’s obviously something amiss with Burger’s thinking—namely
that Amish children might very well decide to pursue a different life.
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Feinberg thus thinks Burger is in an important respect begging the question,
and Feinberg’s reasoning here is instructive:
How is the goal of education to be viewed? That is the question that
must be left open if the court is to issue a truly neutral decision. To
assume that the goal is preparation for modern commercial industrial
life is to beg the question in favor of the state, but equally, to assume
that the goal is preparation for a life aloof from the world is to beg the
question in favor of the parents. An impartial decision would assume
only that education should equip the child with the knowledge and
skills that will help him choose whichever sort of life best fits his
native endowment and matured disposition. It should send him out
in the adult world with as many open opportunities as possible, thus
maximizing his chances for self-fulfillment (Feinberg, 2007, p. 116).
Feinberg is effectively positing a kind of ‘neutrality constraint’ on an ac-
count of the goal of education that will by extension circumscribe what we
can say about the cognitive goods children have a right to vis-a`-vis edu-
cation. Feinberg reveals how the issue of what kinds of cognitive goods
a child can be said to have a right to must be characterised in a way that
is sensitive to a balance of interests between, on the one hand, children’s
rights to an open future and, on the other, parents’ rights to autonomy of
choice in the manner their children are raised.
Question: is there a way to characterise the cognitive goods which chil-
dren plausibly have a right to attain that:
(i) does not violate the child’s right to an open future (including a
possible future that consists in a modern life); and,
(ii) does not simply beg the question against parents (Amish or oth-
erwise) whose supervisory objectives involve avoidance of certain
cognitive influences via knowledge acquisition?
Propositionalism does not seem obviously problematic vis-a`-vis (i),5 but (ii)
is a different story. Indeed, propositionalism seems to have the resources to
satisfy (ii) only at the cost of failing to satisfy (i). To see why, let us stipulate
that ‘K’ denotes a set whose members are propositions children have a right
to learn (whatever these propositions are), in their education. (It follows
from propositionalism that, for any given child, there will be such a set—
viz., a set which includes all and only those propositions students have a
right to know). Now, some propositions will uncontroversially be members
of K—viz., propositions about basic arithmetic, geometry, spelling. Now,
let ‘S’ be a set of facts (to make things simple, call these ‘secular facts’) that
include facts, the knowledge of which will maximise children’s chances of
self-fulfilment (by foreclosing the fewest possibilities). In order to satisfy (i)
propositionalists must allow S to be a subset of K. But in order to satisfy (ii)
propositionalists must allow that some propositions in S are not in K. These
propositions, in S but not K, will be propositions the knowledge of which
can be reasonably taken to contravene and/or undermine the supervisory
rights of parents. Therefore, propositionalism cannot satisfy both (i) and (ii).
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One way to easily satisfy (ii) would be to reject propositionalism in
favour of what we can call ‘dispositionalism’. Let dispositionalism be the
thesis that the cognitive goods to which children have a right in education
are cognitive-dispositional goods, such as the inculcation of intellectual
virtues). This position appears to offer a convenient way to bypass en-
tirely any sort of ‘secular indoctrination’ objection that some parents might
press against the propositionalist’s insistence that children have rights to
know certain facts the knowledge of which stands (as in the case of the
Amish) to conflict with supervisory rights. In short, dispositionalism offers
an attractive way to get around the worry with (ii) that is not available to
propositionalism: in a slogan, you cannot be indoctrinated if there is not
a doctrine. Therefore, if children have a right in their education only to
cognitive-dispositional goods—and it is primarily these goods that an ed-
ucation aims at cultivating—then there are no obvious grounds on which
worries such as Burger’s about conflict with supervisory rights are going to
look compelling.
Dispositionalism might be preferable to propositionalism as well on in-
dependent grounds.6 As Duncan Pritchard writes:
[The] epistemic goal of education might initially be the promotion
of cognitive success [e.g. true beliefs] on the part of the pupil, this
goal should ultimately be replaced with a focus on the development
of the pupil’s cognitive agency, where this means her epistemic virtue
(Pritchard, 2013, p. 246).7
Pritchard defends this suggestion by appealing to the distinction between
friendly and unfriendly epistemic environments. In friendly epistemic en-
vironments (i.e. where one is trusting a reliable informant, under conditions
of full transparency, in a familiar setting), knowledge can be acquired via
testimony and in away that involves little exercise of cognitive ability on the
part of the agent. Merely trusting the word of another seems to be sufficient
for acquiring much knowledge in such environments.8
However, a child suited to learn only in epistemically friendly environ-
ments is surely not very well cognitively prepared to face the world; as
Pritchard remarks, ‘the greater the degree of epistemic unfriendliness in an
environment, then the greater the degree of cognitive ability that is required
in order to gain knowledge’ (ibid.). Dispositionalism seems to gain support
then from the thought that a child has a right to be cognitively prepared
for a range of environments—preparation one does not attain by passively
acquiring knowledge, but by developing cognitive abilities.
However, dispositionalism seems suited to satisfy (ii) at the expense
of failing to satisfy (i). This point can be made by going no further than
Pritchard, whose remarks support a variety of dispositionalism, although not
the variety that would be needed to satisfy (ii). Call weak dispositionalism
the claim that children have a right to cognitive-dispositional goods in their
education; that is to say: children have a (defeasible) right to have certain
cognitive abilities fostered. Weak dispositionalism is compatible with the
propositionalist’s claim that there is (as well) at least some knowledge to
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which children have a right. To rule out such knowledge that renders (ii)
difficult to accommodate, the kind of dispositionalist position needed is
what we can call strong dispositionalism, the thesis that children’s educa-
tional rights are exclusively rights with respect to the cultivation of their
intellectual abilities. On this view, children do not have a right to know
any particular propositions, per se, but rather to have certain dispositions
fostered. This position, unlike weak dispositionalism, seems prima facie to
satisfy the constraint in (ii).
But, problematically, strong dispositionalismwill obviously fail (i).9 Fos-
ter in a child as many intellectual abilities as possible, it remains the case
that if the child is bereft of certain items of propositional knowledge, many
options become foreclosed. There is no way around the fact that failing to
know certain propositions cuts off one’s possibilities, and this is so regard-
less of how well suited one is to come to know them.
In sum, this is our puzzle: regardless of who is right between proposi-
tionalists and dispositionalists, it looks like Feinberg’s neutrality constraint
is impossible to satisfy in a satisfactory way; if the rights a child has to
cognitive goods are propositional rights, then (ii) will not be satisfied; (ii)
(strong) dispositionalism satisfies (ii), but then (i) will not be satisfied.
ELGIN, UNDERSTANDING AND FACTIVITY: AN OBJECTUALIST
PROPOSAL
Catherine Z. Elgin’s (1999) paper ‘Education and the Advancement of
Understanding’ offers a potentialway out of the puzzle just sketched. Elgin’s
primary target is what she calls ‘Plato’s Teaching Assumption’ (PTA), the
thesis that one cannot teach what one does not know. (In the Meno, this
thesis operates in the background of Socrates’ reasoning that there can be
no teachers of virtue given that no one knows what virtue is.) As Elgin sees
it, we can and do teach the unknown; if we could not, she reasons, then
we would not be able to teach such things as philosophy and perhaps even
science,10 where the matter of whether we know what we teach is in doubt.
But we do teach such things and so, contra Plato, it is not true that we cannot
teach what we do not know.
So what is our epistemic standing, then, toward the kind of material
(e.g. philosophy) that we may teach even under conditions of (at least
some level of) ignorance? On the view Elgin proposes, it is understanding.
Understanding, unlike propositional knowledge, is not-factive (i.e. non-
truth-entailing)11 and at the same time it is a worthy educational ideal, one
that may be promoted in a gradient way and which has as its object a subject
matter or body of information. As she sees it:
. . . I suggest, teaching consists in advancing understanding . . . First,
understanding, unlike knowledge, does not require truth. An approxi-
mation, idealization or sketch, although not true, reveals some under-
standing of a subject. If I have a rough understanding of the workings
of the spleen, I may be able to convey it to my students, thus advancing
their even more rudimentary understanding of physiology. And if my
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mechanic has a deep understanding of the workings of the carburetor,
he may be able to convey to me at least a superficial understanding
of it. Even if I acquire no truths about how the carburetor works (the
details required for truth in this area being beyond my ken), I may
now have at least some idea what is going on under the hood. And
investigators who recognize that their current best theories are not
precisely true may nevertheless have something to teach (Elgin, 1999,
pp. 136–137).
If understanding is non-factive, and at the same time an educational aim, then
notice how the view immediately suggests a potential solution strategy to
our guiding puzzle from the previous section: perhaps the kind of cognitive
goods children have a right to are not propositional knowledge goods or
cognitive dispositional goods but rather the kind of cognitive good one
achieves when one attains understanding. On such an Elgin-inspired line,
we may say further that children do not have a right to know any set of
propositions, but rather a right to understand certain bodies of information—
viz., to grasp certain bodies of information and to see, asWayneRiggs puts it
when discussing understanding, how the various pieces of information ‘hang
together’. Call this general position type objectualism: the kind of cognitive
goods children have a right to are best described as objectual cognitive
goods as opposed to propositional or dispositional cognitive goods.
We may now ask: does objectualism fare better than propositionalism or
dispositionalism as a thesis about how to characterise the kind of cognitive
goods to which children may plausibly be said to have a right? There
are two potential worries here for an Elgin-style objectualist route out of
the puzzle; one general, the other specific. The general worry is that it
may be normatively problematic to suppose we have a right to understand
anything. Here a brief comparison between understanding and propositional
knowledge will be instructive. In contemporary social epistemology, it is a
common view that propositional knowledge can be transmitted from speaker
to hearer without the hearer having to do much (or indeed any) cognitive
work. For example, according to the popular non-reductionist tradition in
social epistemology,12 if a speaker knows a proposition p and tells this to
a hearer, then absent any undefeated defeaters possessed by the hearer—
that is, so long as the hearer does not have a positive reason(s) to doubt
that the speaker’s testimony is reliable—then the hearer thereby acquires
knowledge.13
Understanding, by contrast, cannot as plausibly be transmitted via
the same kind of ‘no-work’ mechanism on the part of the hearer.14
Understanding—at least, on most contemporary views—involves exer-
cising a capacity to grasp the relevant coherence-making or explanatory
propositions that constitute a given subject matter.15 Such grasping by the
student, which is partly constitutive of understanding, is not something a
teacher can (without the cooperation and some level of competence of the
student) give the student in the way that knowledge can be given; it is a
fortiori less plausible to suppose that the teacher may have a duty to impart
understanding that would correlate with a student’s right to possess it. At
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most, we might say, the teacher has a duty of non-interference; but such a
duty of non-interference on behalf of the teacher is not one with respect to
which we can easily make sense of the child’s right, in the course of her
education, actually to possess (objectual) cognitive goods.
Setting aside this general worry, there is a more specific problem with
objectualism as a way out of our puzzle. The non-factivity element of the
view—while it does well to satisfy (ii), seems to fail to satisfy (i). After all,
if the kind of cognitive goods children have a right to are objectual goods
which (as Elgin supposes) do not themselves entail factive propositional
goods, then it follows that whatever rights a child has to cognitive goods
can be satisfied even in a case where the child fails to know basic facts—
secular or otherwise.
One might nonetheless argue that objectualism can be adapted to better
satisfy (i). Kvanvig (2003) and Kelp (2016), for example, take objectual
understanding to be a more demanding kind of epistemic standing than
Elgin does. For Kvanvig, understanding a subject matter requires at least a
core cluster of true beliefs, and for Kelp, it involves possession of (various
items of) propositional knowledge. Moving to Kvanvig/Kelp-style factive
objectualism would thus offer a promising way to satisfy (i) not avail-
able to Elgin-style non-factive objectualism. But then, such views fare no
better than propositionalism vis-a`-vis satisfying (ii). Accordingly (and re-
gardless of whether we should opt for a non-factive or a factive version
of objectualism), objectualism does not appear to offer a better answer
than propositionalism or dispositionalism to the question of what kind of
cognitive goods children have a right to.
A NEO-WITTGENSTENIAN RESPONSE
In this section, I sketch an alternative to propositionalism, dispositional-
ism and objectivism. On the view I propose, the kind of cognitive goods
children have a right to in their education are best understood in terms of
what Wittgenstein (1969) calls hinges. To a first approximation, hinges are
propositions that play a certain indispensable role for a thinker within a
given rational structure; they are identifiable by their epistemic profile, not
by their propositional content per se. The idea that children have a right to
certain hinges (or sets of hinges) offers a promising way—more promising
than standard propositionalism, dispositionalism or objectutalism—of cap-
turing the thought that children have a right to certain epistemic goods in a
way that (i) would not plausibly violate the child’s right to an open future
(including a possible future that consists in a modern life); and (ii) does not
simply beg the question against parents whose supervisory objectives in-
volve (reasonable) avoidance of certain cognitive influences via knowledge
acquisition.
Theoretical Backdrop
A dialectical clarification should be registered, before moving forward,
between (a) epistemic goods that children plausibly have a right to in ed-
ucation; and (b) epistemic goods that characterise an excellent (or even
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good) education—viz., an education that is all-things-considered valuable,
desirable, etc. The epistemic goods of interest here are exclusively of the
former kind, which are only a subset of the latter. (And accordingly, that
propositionalism, dispositionalism and objectualism are problematic ways
to characterise the former kinds of epistemic goods need not imply that
we could not articulate the overall aims of education—or the features of
an excellent eduction—with reference to such goods.) That said, some grip
on what an excellent education involves will help us to frame our think-
ing about educational epistemic right, and in a way that will be useful for
approaching our puzzle.
Bearing this in mind, I shall begin with a rough idea of what an excellent
education may involve, and work toward some more specific claims about
rights. At a very general level, I am inclined to take as a starting point David
Bakhurst’s (2011) suggestion—one that is inspired by (among others) John
McDowell’s (1996 passim) epistemology—that the process of education
involves a kind of initiation into the space of reasons. Human beings are not
‘born’ into the space of reasons, but education (or, for Bakhurst, Bildung)
helps to guide them there, by turning them from a kind of non-rational
animal into a ‘thinker’ or agent.16 As Bakhurst puts it:
the development of a human being is marked by a transformation: we
become beings whose lives manifest freedom as we acquire rational
powers, powers whose exercise is second nature to us . . . forma-
tion of reason involves not merely biological maturation, but cultural
formation, or Bildung (Bakhurst, 2012, p. 173).
How exactly does such transformation work, whereby we acquire rational
powers (and thus our second nature) in this way? Here’s Bakhurst with a
summary sketch of the view he defends in The Formation of Reason:
Learning is amatter of acquiring the conceptual capacities and qualities
of character that enable responsiveness to reasons, and teaching is a
matter of facilitating their acquisition and development. Learning is
successful to the degree that the learner gains command of the subject-
matter or practice, where to have such command is to be able to make
up one’s mind about what to think or do in the relevant domain in
light of what there is most reason to think or do. This involves the
development and cultivation of theoretical and practical reasoning,
understood not as formal or abstract techniques of thought, but as
powers to engage intelligently with concrete subject-matter in all its
presentness and particularity (Bakhurst, 2011, p. 136).
Acquiring the power or ‘command to make up one’s mind about what to
think or do in light of what there is reason to think or do’ is, as Bakhurst
submits, a valuable form of autonomy, and thus, the idea that education
initiates one into the space of reasons in the manner described comports
with the corollary idea (explicitly embraced by Bakhurst) that education
should be understood as aiming at autonomy—viz., at the kind of freedom
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that is associated with wielding certain kinds of rational powers as second
nature.
The above view is of course not one about what cognitive goods a student
has a right to per se, but a view more generally about both the structure
of the educational process and its aim. Nonetheless, the kind of picture
Bakhurst advances—when paired with some further ideas—gives us all the
materials needed to address in a promising way the initial puzzle articulated
about rights.
There is, however, an initial hurdle. Notice that if (a la Bakhurst) a child
enters into theMcDowellian space of reasons17 by acquiring certain rational
powers (and accordingly gains the associated kind of autonomy), then—at
least if those powers are primarily unpacked as capacities or dispositions—
then it is not clear how such a strategy would ultimately fare better than
dispositionalist accounts as a way of navigating the puzzle about rights.
Recall that, on the supposition that the kinds of cognitive goods children
have a right to are dispositional goods, then the worry was that (ii) could be
satisfied but not (i); in short, it seems that there are basic facts that children
have a right to know, and dispositionalist views of the kinds of cognitive
goods children have a right to cannot obviously countenance this.
However, there may be another way to think about how the child acquires
rational powers, by focusing on certain enabling conditions (rather than the
powers themselves), and then to view the right a child has to cognitive
goods in an education as a right to such enabling conditions. This is the line
I want to now pursue.
On the kind of epistemological position advanced in Wittgenstein’s
posthumous On Certainty (1969), the capacity to engage in the activity
of giving and requesting reasons, and thus the capacity to exercise one’s
rational powers, requires that certain things are themselves in deed not
doubted. As Wittgenstein puts it:
The questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that
some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on
which those turn. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific
investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted. But it is not
that the situation is like this: We just cannot investigate everything,
and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If
I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (Wittgenstein, 1969,
§§341–343).
Wittgenstein’s ‘hinge’ metaphor, used to refer to propositions that play a
certain role in our investigations, is the inspiration for what later commen-
tators call hinge propositions.18 Hinge propositions have a special epistemic
status. Firstly, they must be in place for rational inquiry to take place. And,
secondly, they cannot themselves be rationally doubted, or for that matter
rationally supported, from within the rational network they support.
It may seem initially perplexing that some propositions lie beyond what
can be rationally doubted or supported. Wittgenstein’s thinking here, his-
torically at least, is a response to G.E. Moore’s (1939) attempt to prove the
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existence of external things by appealing to perceptual evidence indicating
the presence of a hand, an external thing. Wittgenstein’s objection, in short,
is that Moore’s reasoning is defective because he is no more certain of what
he is appealing to (viz., the presence of hands) than of what he’s appealing
to it in order to prove (viz., that an external world exists).19 Implicit in
this objection is a commitment to a more general principle about the struc-
ture of relations of rational support: one cannot support the more certain
by appealing to the less certain. Here are some passages that reflect this
idea:
If a blind man were to ask me ‘Have you got two hands?’ I should
not make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then I do
not know why I should trust my eyes. For why should not I test my
eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be
tested by what? (Wittgenstein, 1969, §125)
If someone doubted whether the earth had existed a hundred years
ago, I should not understand, for this reason: I would not know what
such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what
not (§231).
My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as any-
thing that I could produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a
position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it (§250).
Of course, if the very structure of rational support is such that what is less
certain cannot be rationally adduced in support of (or to doubt) what is
more certain, an interesting consequence is that those propositions that are
most certain are themselves neither rationally supportable nor rationally
doubtable with reference to any of the other things one believes. Such
propositions—hinge propositions—must be in place, qua propositions that
are not doubted, as an enabling condition for the exercise of rational powers
in rational evaluation.
I shall return to this point. First, though, two final substantive points about
hinges: (a) there are multiple categories of hinges; and (b) which proposi-
tions play the functional role of a hinge in a given category can change over
time. Regarding (a): Martin Kusch identifies at least five different ‘cate-
gories’ of hinges in Wittgenstein’s epistemology, which differ in how these
certainties ‘relate to evidence, justification and knowledge’:
Category I consists of beliefs for which we have evidence that is both
overwhelming and (at least in good part) dialectically mute. . . . (e.g.
‘ . . . here is a hand.’ §1) Category II is the class of mathematical
propositions that have ‘officially been given the stamp of incontesta-
bility’ (§655). Category III cases are fundamental empirical-scientific
beliefs (e.g. ‘The earth is round.’ §291; ‘Water boils at 100°C.’ §293).
Category IV embodies beliefs that constitute what we might call ‘do-
mains of knowledge’. I mean certainties like ‘ . . . the earth has existed
for many years past’ (§411), or ‘ . . . the earth exists’ (§209). Finally,
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Category V consists of fundamental religious beliefs, like ‘Jesus only
had a human mother.’ (§239) (Kusch, 2016, pp. 29–31).
Each category features propositions that, due to various kinds of consider-
ations, cannot be rationally supported by other more certain propositions.20
Of course, some hinges are shiftable. That is, a given proposition p (e.g.
‘Water boils at 100°C’) may be a recently acquired hinge. Others hinges
(e.g. ‘2 + 2 = 4’) are not equally shiftable—a point Pritchard has drawn
sustained attention to in recent work.21 Wittgenstein appreciates this point
in his famous ‘river bed’ analogy:
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empiri-
cal propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such
empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this re-
lation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard
ones became fluid. The mythology may change back into a state of
flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the
movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. . . . And
the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alter-
ation or to only an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one
place now in another gets washed away, or deposited (Wittgenstein,
1969, §§96–99).
The Proposal in Outline
Returning now to the bigger picture: I suggested that there may be another
way to think about how the child acquires rational powers, by focusing
on certain enabling conditions (rather than the powers themselves), and
then viewing the right a child has to cognitive goods in an education as a
right to such enabling conditions. I now want to suggest that these enabling
conditions for a child’s acquisition of rational powers are certain kinds of
hinges, and further, that it is access to such hinges to which children can
plausibly be said to have a right in an education.
The strategy now will be as follows: I’ll show how my approach has
the resources to overcome the problems that faced (i) propositionalism, (ii)
dispositionalism, and (iii) objectualism, while retaining some of the key
advantages of each. In the course of doing so, I will develop the core idea
in more detail.
Propositionalism Revisited
Recall, again, the puzzle: Is there a way to characterise the cognitive goods
to which children plausibly have a right to attain that:
(i) would not plausibly violate the child’s right to an open future (in-
cluding a possible future that consists in a modern life); and,
(ii) which does not simply beg the question against parents whose super-
visory objectives involve avoidance of certain cognitive influence
via knowledge acquisition?
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It looked like none of the views canvassed could preserve both (i) and
(ii). Given that children plausibly have a right to know certain basic facts
(else many futures they may later wish to opt for be closed off to them),
propositionalism initially looked like a natural starting point. The view can
make sense of the idea that children have a right to the kind of propositional
knowledge we assume they have a right to. But, as Feinberg pointed out,
once we make this knowledge explicit, then it will be either too narrow
vis-a`-vis an open future, or too wide to claim children have a right to it
while at the same time respecting the supervisory rights of parents.
A hinge strategy offers a way forward. The ground-level idea is that
children have a right to certain hinges, where a command of such hinges
enables children to possess rational powers and by extension a valuable
sort of autonomy. On such a view, children have a right in their education
not (as propositionalism says) to particular items of knowledge per se, but
rather to propositions only in so far as they play a particular role in a certain
(to-be-specified) rational structure.
This of course raises the question:Which hinges do children have a right
to? The answer, I want to now suggest, is a right to a sufficient supply of
what Kusch terms ‘Category 4’ hinges, those that are at the foundation of
various domains of knowledge. Take, for example, mathematics. There are
certain axioms and rules that cannot very well be rationally supported from
within mathematics but which must be assumed in order for one to even
do mathematics; without access to such axioms, the capacity to traffic in
mathematical reasons is completely foreclosed. Children will have a right
to such axioms, and these are propositions, but the right extends to any
given particular set of axioms only in so far as possessing it is indispensible
to a certain kind of reasoning that characterises a domain of knowledge
pertinent to the child’s open future. If it turned out that (a la the river bed
analogy) a particular axiom became less certain over time from within the
domain of mathematics, and that not doubting it was no longer necessary to
do mathematics, then the right to that particular hinge will be undercut.
Take another example from Kusch: certain things (such as the existence
of the earth, basic physical laws) must be held fast in order to do various
physical sciences, where ‘doing’ these sciences at least involves reasoning
from within the knowledge domain, viz., taking and receiving the kinds
of reasons that are characteristic of this particular domain of knowledge.
Without access to such hinges, a student (quite literally) is without a certain
kind of autonomy—viz., the autonomy to exercise her rational powers in
the scientific domain of knowledge, effectively cutting such domains off for
her and by extension possible futures, the successful realisation of which
would be predicated on the capacity to exercise such powers.
What is it like to have the capacity to think from within a discipline
‘cut off’ from one (as would be the case if one is denied access to cer-
tain hinges?) Here an analogy to Ian Hacking’s work on styles of reason-
ing is apt. As Hacking points out, some statements can be made in any
language, though others require what he calls a ‘style of reasoning’. As
Hacking puts it, ‘what is true-or-false in one way of talking may not make
much sense in another until one has learned how to reason in a new way’
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(Hacking, 1982, p. 331). Accordingly, for example, ‘statistical reasons had
no force for the Greeks’, much as reasons offered in some ancient systems
are incomprehensible to us today. Take, for example, ‘renaissance medical,
alchemical and astrological doctrines of resemblance and similitude [which]
are well-nigh incomprehensible . . . the way propositions are proposed and
defended is entirely alien to us’ (p. 330). (For example, that mercury salve
might be good for syphilis because mercury is signed by the planet Mercury
which signs the marketplace, where syphilis is contracted.22)
That statistical reasons had no force for the Greeks (and that medieval al-
chemical reasons have no force for us) is telling; without certain background
commitments relative to which discipline-specific reasons are given their
sense, we (literally) are not in a position to think within that discipline—
viz., to be rationally moved by the kinds of reasons that are specific to that
discipline.
Of course, a right to hinges is at the same time a right to certain proposi-
tions (including many of the facts that students will intuitively have a right
to know23), however it is not a right de dicto to any particular propositional
contents (a specification of such a right in terms of specific propositional
contents, recall, threatened to violate Feinberg’s neutrality constraint if
specified widely enough to not undermine a child’s open future). The right
itself may be satisfied even if the content itself shifts—viz., even if a propo-
sition that at one time was necessary in order to reason in a particular
domain-relevant way became no longer necessary.24
The matter of which domains of knowledge are such that a child has
a right in an education to the hinges that make possible rational moves
within these domains is one that cannot be determined a priori. The facts
that fix what count as the kinds of futures that should be left open—an
issue beyond the scope of this essay—will also by extension determine the
relevant domains of knowledge, as well as their breadth.
Dispositionalism Revisited
Dispositionalist accounts seemed to do well by way of (ii) in the puzzle,
less so by way of (i). The worry, in short, was that if a right to acquire
certain cognitive dispositions or skills is what characterises the kind of cog-
nitive goods children have a right to in education, then such a right could
in principle be satisfied even if a child failed to possess certain basic facts
that a suitably open future would (very plausibly) demand they know. The
proposed hinge view avoids this result; the right to certain hinges is at the
same time a right to certain foundational propositions (many, if not all,25
will be true or at least empirically adequate) and will include basic mathe-
matical and scientific claims that dispositionalism cannot straightforwardly
countenance.26
Moreover, the hinge view retains a key benefit distinctive of disposi-
tionalism: dispositionalism aligns with the thought that certain skills are
prerequisites for a suitably open future, and that thus there is a prima facie
case for a right to such skills in education. The hinge view can accom-
modate this idea, albeit in a qualified way; on the hinge view, the right in
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question is not to the powers themselves (viz., it is not a right to be in the
dispositional state one is in when one possesses such powers, and this due
to complications that also faced objectualism) but rather to the enabling
conditions for these powers—viz., to the hinges, command of which allows
for the possibility of the exercise of rational powers in the relevant domains.
Objectualism Revisited
According to objectualism, the cognitive goods children have a right to are
objectual goods—viz., to bodies of information or subject matters them-
selves, andmoreover, such objectual goods are possessed onlywhen grasped
in the right kind ofway, e.g. when one understands. Objectualism comported
with the idea that, for instance, students have a right to understand chem-
istry, physics, etc., as opposed to merely to know certain facts or possess
certain skills.
Objectualism, recall, faced a normative problem: the kind of grasping a
subject matter that is plausibly partly constitutive of understanding it, is not
something that a teacher can (without the cooperation and some level of
competence of the agent) give the student. Accordingly, it is less plausible—
certainly less plausible than in the case of propositional knowledge, which
can be transmitted more straightforwardly—to suppose that the teacher may
have a duty to impart understanding that would correlate with a student’s
right to possess it.
The hinge strategy, by contrast with objectualism, submits merely that
students have a right to the enabling conditions, i.e. to be presented with
the relevant hinges that correspond with certain domains of knowledge and
without which the child would not be in a position to exercise her rational
powers by reasoning from within these domains—viz., domains of knowl-
edge that are apposite to a relevant range of open futures the child might
later freely choose (from practical/vocational to the theoretical); the right is
not to be identified as a right to understand (which takes effort and compe-
tence on behalf of the subject) but to have an opportunity autonomously to
make certain kinds of rational moves.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We began with a puzzle: apart from what cognitive goods characterise an
excellent education—viz., the sort of cognitive states an education should
aim at inculcating—is the comparatively narrower question of what cogni-
tive goods a child has a right to in an education. How should such goods
be specified? I’ve suggested, with reference to Feinberg’s discussion of the
relationship between education and an open future, that typical answers to
the guiding question turn out to be problematic. In particular, it has been
shown that propositionalist, dispositionalist and objectualist accounts of the
kinds of cognitive goods children have a right to in education are each (for
different reasons) inadequate. The alternative offered here is inspired by
Wittgenstein’s epistemology: children have a right to certain hinges, where
a command of such hinges enables children to possess rational powers in
certain domains of knowledge and by extension a valuable sort of autonomy
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in these domains. This view has been shown to have important advantages
over the three alternatives considered as a way of making sense of rights
in education, and in a way that comports with plausible thinking about the
goals of education.27
Correspondence: J. Adam Carter, Philosophy, School of Humanities, Uni-




1. State v. Garber, 1966.
2. The right to an open future that is claimed to be violated in the Kansas case is shorthand for
autonomy rights children have ‘in trust’—rights that are ‘saved for the child until he is an adult,
but which can be violated in advance’ (see Feinberg, 2007).
3. This suggestion is meant only as a useful starting point for discussion. As we’ll see, this idea
quickly runs into some difficulties.
4. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972.
5. Although there may be philosophically sophisticated reasons for thinking that it is; see Pritchard,
2013, and Elgin, 1996.
6. For one notable defence of a reasoning-based version of dispositionalism, see Locke, 1988.
7. Variations of this idea are defended by two prominent positions in the epistemology of education.
According to the intellectual virtue approach (e.g. Baehr, 2013) an education should aim in themain
to inculcate intellectual character virtues in the student, such as open-mindedness, inquisitiveness,
intellectual courage, etc. A different form of dispositionalism is the critical thinking approach,
defended notably by Scheffler (2014) and Siegel (1988). For an overview, see Carter and Kotzee,
2015.
8. This is a view compatible with both reductionist and non-reductionist approaches in the epistemol-
ogy of testimony. According to (local) non-reductionists, you’ll have already satisfied in friendly
environments the testimony-independent reason requirement on testimonial knowledge acquisi-
tion; and, according to non-reductionists, you’ll have satisfied the no-defeater requirement on
testimonial knowledge acquisition. For discussion of these views, see Lackey, 2008, and Goldman
and Blanchard, 2016.
9. Strong dispositionalism may also fail (ii) as well. Consider, for instance, that open-mindedness,
healthy scepticism, critical thinking, intellectual curiosity, epistemic rigour, scientific method, and
so on, are not virtues that sit easily with many kinds of fundamentalist thinking. Moreover, it would
be difficult to inclucate (for instance) many such dispositions without reference to certain specific
propositions. For example, one cannot very well educate for a disposition to love truth without
reference to particular truths. Thanks to David Bakhurst for raising these points.
10. As Elgin writes, ‘Even the “mature sciences” rarely yield knowledge, strictly so-called. Anomalies,
discrepancies, and outstanding problems challenge the adequacy of our most strongly supported
theories’ (Elgin, 1999, p. 39).
11. For critical discussion, see Carter and Gordon, 2016.
12. See, for example, Audi, 1997; Burge, 1993; Coady, 1992; McDowell, 1994.
13. Cf. Jennifer Lackey’s (2008) ‘compulsively trusting’ case for a notable challenge to this idea.
14. See Gordon, 2016, for helpful discussion on this point.
15. This idea has been defended by Kvanvig, 2003, 2009; Grimm, 2014; and Gordon, 2016.
16. For a critique of Bakhurst’s view of the kind of tranformation that characterises the educational
process, see Ro¨dl, 2016. Cf. Bakhurst, 2015. It is worth noting that despite differences about
the transformational view, Ro¨dl would likely embrace Bakhurst’s position in the second block
quotation.
17. It should be noted that nothing important here turns material adequacy of a further epistemological
doctrine associated with McDowell’s epistemology, and also embraced by Bakhurst—namely,
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McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge (see, for example, Mc-
Dowell, 1995; Bakhurst, 2013 and 2018).
18. For representative discussions of hinge propositions inWittgenstein’s epistemology, see for exam-
ple Moyal-Sharrock, 2004; Coliva, 2010 and 2015; McGinn, 2008; Stroll, 1994; Pritchard, 2012
and 2015.
19. For an overview of recent work on Moore’s Proof, see Carter, 2012.
20. There may be a further category of hinge—what Duncan Pritchard (2015, p. 95) calls the u¨ber-
hinge, which is a general hinge commitment to the effect that one is not radically mistaken in one’s
beliefs en masse.
21. As Pritchard notes, ‘someone in the future might not have a hinge commitment that she had never
been to the moon (perhaps going to the moon as a child is so commonplace that it is the sort of thing
that could well have happened without one being aware of it), and someone with a different name
will presumably take it as a hinge commitment that her particular name is the name she thinks
it is. The foregoing suggests a highly context-sensitive account of hinge commitments, and one
might be tempted on this basis to regard one’s hinge commitments as being entirely context-bound’
(Pritchard, 2015, p. 95). Pritchard ultimately resists drawing the further conclusion that all hinges
are context sensitive in this way (see previous footnote concerning the u¨ber-hinge).
22. For a more detailed discussion of Hacking’s view, see Carter and Gordon, 2014a.
23. Some Wittgenstein commentators (e.g. Moyal-Sharrock, 2004) opt for a ‘non-propositional’ read-
ing of hinges. Such a reading gains some plausibility when we consider the disanalogies between
hinges, within a thinker’s network of beliefs, and other more standard propositions one believes.
However, hinges as described by Wittgenstein (and as demarcated through examples) are iden-
tified as having the semantic trappings of propositions; while registering the controversy, I am
inclined toward the propositional reading as the most straightforward, if not the only plausible,
interpretation.
24. Of course, we can imagine some proponents of parental supervisory rights objecting that: (i) it does
not matter whether a right to engage with certain propositional contents is not a right de dicto to
any particular propositional contents if the parents find those particular propositions objectionable;
and (ii) therefore, the hinge strategy proposed ultimately fails Feinberg’s neutrality constraint.
In response, I want to stress that the proposal offered is aimed at giving due consideration to
both parental supervisory rights and a child’s right to an open future. I am suggesting that the
neo-Wittgenstenian approach has resources that other strategies lack for addressing both of these
concerns in balance. It will not be surprising that such an approach might not satisfy certain very
strongly articulated construals of Feinberg’s neutrality constraint (just as it would perhaps not
satisfy certain very strong construals of what is required to safeguard a child’s right to an open
future). Given that the approach has the advantages it does for addressing both competing interests,
it should not be viewed as an intractable problem that the proposal will not satisfy all readings
of Feinberg’s neutrality constraint. Indeed, a strong reading of that constraint may well leave it
practically impossible to satisfy while retaining even the weakest construal of a child’s right to an
open future.
25. Cf. §239. Of course, it is a consequence of the view embraced here that students may have a right
to some propositions that are not strictly factual. An example from Elgin (2007) is helpful: the
ideal gas law is literally false—viz., though proceeding as if it were true is necessary for grasping
the behaviour of actual gases. For related discussion, see Carter and Gordon, 2016.
26. See, for example, Wittgenstein, 1969, §§655, §291 and §293.
27. Thanks to Ben Kotzee, Duncan Pritchard, Lani Watson, Richard Menary, Emma C. Gordon, David
Bakhurst, and to an audience at Edinburgh’s Eidyn Research Centre for helpful feedback on an
early version of this paper.
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